'"•"* 

A    000611  006    8 

SPEECH 


Hon.    HOKIE-    SMITH, 


AT  JEFFERSON,  GA., 
TUESDAY,  AUGUST  6,  1895. 


Mr.  I'lt'iii-iiKiit  nitd  Fellow   Citizens: 

Three  years  ago,  just  after  the  democratic  national  convention  was  held  at 
Chicago,  I  had  the  pleasure  of  addressing  you.  I  then  gave  especial  attention 
to  the  importance  of  reducing  the  tariff  taxes.  I  undertook  to  show  that  a 
high  tariff  placed  unjust  burdens  upon  the  agricultural  classes,  and  that  the 
greatest  benefit  which  could  come  to  you  from  legislation  would  be  the  reduc- 
tion of  the  tariff.  If  you  were  taxed  on  all  the  costs  of  production,  so  that 
you  could  make  no  profit  from  working  your  farms,  you  would  be  without 
money,  no  matter  how  great  the  volume  in  the  country  might  be. 

Since  that  time  a  reduction  of  the  tariff  has  been  made  by  democratic 
efforts.  The  reduction  was  less  than  we  hoped,  but  while  a  few  democrats  in 
the  senate  failed  to  support  the  bill  prepared  by  the  democrats  in  the  house, 
you  must  not  lose  sight  of  the  fact  that  none  of  the  Populists  in  the  senate 
stood  squarely  by  tariff  reform.  x 

Local  interests  seemed  to  have  checked  their  ardor.  This  was  to  be  expected, 
for  the  Populist  party  has  its  chief  following  from  a  section  filled  with  local 
schemes,  none  of  them  calculated  to  benefit  the  people  of  this  state. 

They  have  great  silver  mines.  It  is,  perhaps,  natural  that  they  should  feel 
more  interest  in  helping  silver  bullion  than  in  preserving  sound  currency. 

I  shall  not,  to-day,  discuss  generally  the  platform  of  the  Populists.  I  wish 
to  give  attention  especially  to  the  money  question,  and  to  the  effort  now  being 
made  to  commit  the  democrats  of  Georgia  to  the  support  of  the  free,  unlimited 
and  independent  coinage  of  silver  at  the  ratio  of  16  to  1. 

A  silver  dollar,  as  now  coined,  has  371J  grains  of  pure  silver  in  it.  A  gold 
dollar,  as  now  coined,  has  23  22-100  grains  of  pure  gold  in  it.  The  silver  dollar 
contains  sixteen  times  as  many  grains  of  silver  as  the  gold  dollar  does  of  gold  ; 
23  22-100  grains  of  pure  gold,  uncoined,  are  worth  100  cents;  37l£  grains  of  pure 
silver,  uncoined,  are  worth  51  cents. 

The  word  "free,"  as  applied  to  the  coinage  of  silver,  means,  literally, 
without  any  charge  against  the  bullion  holder,  but  in  general  acceptation,  it 

ins,  also,  unlimited,  independent  coinage  at  16  to  1.     "  Unlimited  "  means 
the  Government  shall  coin  all  the  silver  bullion  that  is  offered  for  coinage, 
ependent "  means  without   reference   to  the  action  of  foreign  countries 
ithoiit  reference  to  the  value  the  world  over  of  silver  bullion, 
have  the  proposition  made  that  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
>in  all  the  silver  bullion  offered  at  the  mints,  putting  only  371 J  grains 
lollar,  although  that  many  grains  are  worth  much  less  than  a  dollar,  and 
h  it  requires  100  cents  worth  of  gold  for  tho  coinage  of  a  gold  doi1 


The  16  to  1  plan  of  the  extreme  silver  men,  therefore,  requires  the  silver  dollar 
to  contain  only  sixteen  times  as  many  grains  of  silver  as  a  gold  dollar  contains 
of  gold,  while  a  grain  of  gold  is  worth  about  thirty-two  times  as  much  as  a  grain 
of  silver,  and  it  proposes  to  allow  both  silver  and  gold  to  be  coined  in  unlimited 
quantities  at  this  ratio. 

ELAN   PROPOSED     WOULD    CAUSE    SILVER     MONOMETALLISM — HE    FAVORS   GOLD  AND 

•     SILVER,  BOTH. 

I  am  in  favor  of  the  use  of  both  gold  and  silver  as  money,  and  my  opposition 
to  the  unlimited,  independent  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1  is  not  due  to  any  hos- 
tility to  silver,  but  to  the  firm  conviction  that  the  plan  proposed  will  change 
our  currency  system  from  one  which  furnishes  both  .  gold  and  silver  to  one 
which  will  furnish  nothing  but  silver.  We  now  have  a  system  of  limited  bimet- 
allism. Under  the  plan  of  the  extreme  silver  men  we  would  have  silver  mono- 
metallism. While  you  should  favor  all  the  gold  and  silver  as  money  which  can 
be  kept  sound  and  eqnal  in  purchasing  power,  I  urge  you  to  oppose  the  free 
silver  16  to  1  plan,  because  it  would  not  give  bimetallism,  but  would  bring  the 
United  States  to  the  Asiatic  basis  of  silver  money  only. 

I  deny  that  it  is  possible  with  free,  unlimited  and  independent  coinage  to 
keep  in  circulation  two  different  metals,  coined  into  money,  where  the  plan  of 
coinage  does  not  recognize  the  commercial  value  of  the  bullion  of  each  metal 
put  into  a  dollar.  If  the  proportion  is  so  adjusted  as  to  make  the  bullion  of  one 
of  the  metals  put  into  a  dollar  of  less  value  than  the  bullion  of  the  other  metal 
put  into  a  dollar,  and  the  opportunity  for  the  coinage  of  both  metals  is  unlim- 
ited, then  the  necessary  result  will  be  the  coinage  and  use  of  the  cheaper  metal 
only,  and  the  loss  as  money  of  the  more  valuable  metal. 

f 

THE   GRESHAM   LAW. 

This  is  the  principle  frequently  referred  to  as  the  Gresham  law,  named  from 
Sir  Thomas  Gresham,  who  wrote  on  the  subject  of  finance  during  the  reign  of 
Queen  Elizabeth  of  England.  He  thus  expresses  the  principle  as  applicable  to 
money  and  business  : 

"If  debased  coin  is  attempted  to  be  circulated  with  full- valued  coin,  all  of 
the  latter  will  disappear  from  circulation  and  the  over-valued  and  debased  coin 
will  alone  remain  to  the  ruin  of  our  commerce  and  business." 

I  shall  show  that  unlimited  coinage  at  16  to  1  means  the  unlimited  coinage 
of  51  cents  worth  of  silver  into  dollars,  which  would  result  in  a  debased  cur- 
rency, causing  gold  to  disappear  from  circulation,  leaving  nothing  but  silver  in 
use  "  to  the  ruin  of  our  commerce  and  business." 

HISTORY   OF   COINAGE   FROM   1792   TO   1860. 

For  the  purpose  of  investigating  the  proposition  which  I  have  just  sic 
ask  your  attention  first  to  the  history  of  the  coinage  of  gold  and  silver 
United  States,  that  the  practical  experience  of  the  past  may  show  what 
expected  in  the  future.    In  1792  a  bimetallic  system  of  coining  gold  ar 
was  adopted.     It  was  planned  by  Thomas  Jefferson  and  Alexander  I 
Though  belonging  to  different  political  parties,  they  agreed  entirely 
business  principles  involved  in  the  use  of  gold  and  silver  as  money. 

r-*-- 


UCSB  LIBRARY 


HAMILTON'S  POSITION. 

Mr.  Hamilton,  in  his  report  as  secretary  of  the  treasury,  May  5,  1791,  said  : 
"As  long  as  gold,  either  from  its  intrinsic  superiority  as  a  metal,  from  its 
rarity,  or  from  the  prejtidice  of  mankind,  retains  such  a  prominence  and  value 
over  silver  as  it  hitherto  has,  a  natural  consequence  of  this  seems  to  be  that  its 
condition  will  be  more  stationary.  The  revolutions,  therefore,  which  may  take 
place  in  the  comparative  value  of  gold  and  silver  will  be  changed  in  the  state  of 
the  latter  rather  than  that  of  the  former.  *  *  *  That  species  of  coin,  i.  e., 
Spanish  silver  dollars,  has  never  had  any  settled  or  standard  value,  according  to 
weight  or  fineness,  but  has  been  permitted  to  circulate  by  tale  without  regard 
to  their  advantage  as  a  mere  money  of  convenience,  while  gold  has  had  a  fixed 
price  by  weight  and  with  an  eye  to  its  fineness.  The  greater  stability  of  value 
of  the  gold  coin  is  an  argument  of  force  for  regarding  the  money  unit  as  having 
been  hitherto  virtually  attached  to  gold  rather  than  to  silver.  *  *  *  24| 
grains  of  fine  gold  have  corresponded  with  the  nominal  value  of  the  silver  dol- 
lar, without  regard  to  the  successive  diminutions  of  its  intrinsic  worth." 

JEFFERSON'S  VIEW. 

Mr.  Jefferson  said  '  "  The  proportion  between  the  values  of  gold  and  silver 
is  a  mercantile  problem  altogether.  *  *  *  Just  principles  will  lead  us  to 
'disregard  proportions  altogether  ;  to  inquire  into  the  market  price  of  gold  in 
the  several  countries  with  which  we  shall  principally  be  connected  in  commerce 
and  to  take  an  average  from  them.  Perhaps  we  might,  with  safety,  lean  to  a 
proportion  somewhat  above  par  for  gold,  considering  our  neighborhood  and 
commerce  with  the  sources  of  the  coin.  *  *  *  It  is  not  impossible  that  15 
to  1  may  be  found  an  eligible  proportion.  *  *  *  The  present  market  price 
of  gold  and  silver  in  England  is  15.5  for  one  ;  in  Russia,  15  ;  in  Holland,  14.75  ; 
Savoy,  14.6;  France,  14.42;  Spain,  14.03;  Germany,  14.55;  the  average  of 
which  is  14.  673.  I  would  be  inclined  to  give  a  little  more  than  market  price  for 
gold,  because  of  its  superior  convenience  of  transportation.  " 

These  two  great  statesmen,  after  a  careful  study  of  the  commercial  value  of 
silver  and  gold  bullion,  determined  that  gold  was  worth  a  little  less  than  fifteen 
times  as  much  as  silver,  and  as  they  considered  silver  the  less  stable  of  the  two 
metals,  they  intended  to  put  a  full  quota  of  silver  in  a  dollar  to  keep  it  even  with 
the  gold  dollar.  They  took  as  a  standard  24J  grains  of  gold  and  multiplied  it 
by  15,  giving  371  i  grains,  which  number  they  determined  upon  as  the  silver 
grains  to  be  put  into  a  dollar.  They  did  not,  for  one  moment,  pretend  .that  a 
plan  of  free  and  unlimited  coinage  by  the  United  States  would  increase  the  value 
of  silver  or  gold  bullion,  and  they  recognized  the  Gresham  law  that  bi-metallism 
could  not  exist  unless  the  uncoined  silver  put  into  a  dollar  was  of  equal  value 
with  the  uncoined  gold  put  into  a  dollar.  At  that  time  international  transpor- 
tation and  communication  were  limited.  For  a  while  both  gold  and  silver  were 
used  ;  but  in  1806,  by  the  direction  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  who  was  then  president, 
the  coinage  of  silver  dollars  was  suspended,  under  the  following  order,  issued 
by  the  then  secretary  of  state  : 

DEPARTMENT  or  STATE,  May  6,  1806. 
BOBERT  PATTERSON,  Esq.,  Director  of  the  Mint  : 

SIR  —  In  consequence  of  a  representation  from  the  director  of  the  bank  of  the 
United  States  that  considerable  purchases  have  been  made  of  dollars  coined  at 
the  mint  for  the  purpose  of  exporting  them,  and  as  it  is  probable  that  further 


purchases  and  exportation  will  be  made,  the  president  directs  that  the  silver 
coined  at  the  mint  shall  be  of  smaller  denominations,  so  that  the  value  of  the 
largest  piece  shall  not  exceed  a  half  a  dollar.  I  am,  etc., 

(Signed)  JAMES  MADISON. 

Thus  it  was,  as  far  back  as  1806,  that  Mr.  Jefferson,  while  believing  in  a  bi- 
metallic currency,  recognized  the  principle  that  it  may  at  times  be  necessary  to 
throw  restrictions  around  the  coinage  of  a  metal  to  accomplish  the  ultimate 
purpose  of  the  use  of  both  metals.  And  from  1806,  for  thirty  years,  no  silver 
dollars  were  coined. 

William  H.  Crawford,  Georgia's  most  distinguished  son,  in  1820,  when  secre- 
tary of  the  treasury,  discussed  the  same  principle  which  Mr.  Jefferson  pre- 
sented, and  held  that  bi-metallism  was  impossible  unless  the  proportion  of  gold 
and  silver  put  into  a  coined  dollar  was  fixed  by  the  commercial  value  of  the 
bullion  of  each  metal  before  coinage.  That  is  to  say,  the  silver  put  into  a 
dollar  must  be  worth  a  hundred  cents  before  it  is  coined,  and  the  gold  put  into 
a  dollar  must  be  worth  a  hundred  cents  before  it  is  coined. 

15  TO  1  FIKST  RATIO  CAUSED  SILVER  STANDARD. 

As  before  stated,  the  plan  of  coinage  adopted  first  was  15  to  1 ;  that  is  to 
say,  fifteen  times  as  many  grains  of  silver  as  of  gold  were  put  into  a  dollar. 
But  Jefferson  and  Hamilton  were  mistaken  as  to  the  commercial  value  of  silver, 
or  else  its  value  decreased,  for  after  a  few  years  from  the  time  when  the  law  was 
passed,  in  1792,  fifteen  grains  of  silver  had  ceased  to  be  worth  as  much  as  one 
grain  of  gold.  The  result  was,  gold  went  out  of  circulation.  It  was  coined 
only  in  limited  quantities,  and  that  for  shipment.  The  United  States  went  to 
the  silver  standard.  Silver  was  practically  the  otly  money  in  circulation,  and 
although  the  difference  between  the  value  of  the  silver  bullion  put  into  a  dollar 
and  the  value  of  the  gold  bullion  put  into  a  dollar  was  less  than  5  per  cent., 
unlimited  coinage  of  silver  failed  to  raise  the  value  of  silver  bullion  this  small 
amount. 

JACKSON  APPROVED  CHANGE  OF  RATIO. 

In  1834  Andrew  Jackson  was  president.  Thomas  H.  Benton  was  the  great 
democratic  leader  in  the  senate.  He  declared,  in  the  senate,  that  bimetallism 
was  impossible  at  the  ratio  of  15  to  1,  and  called  attention  to  the  fact  that  the 
United  States  was  on  the  single  silver  standard.  Recognizing  the  necessity  of 
bringing  the  coinage  ratio  to  the  commercial  ratio  of  the  two  metals,  and  seeing 
that  it  'was  impossible  for  unlimited  coinage  to  substantially  affect  the  value  of 
either  metal,  President  Jackson  approved  an  act  of  congress  changing  the  ratio 
from  15  to  1  to  16  to  1.  To  accomplish  this  he  reduced  the  number  of  grains  of 
gold  put  into  a  dollar  to  23  22-100.  He  took  this  course  to  avoid  a  change  of 
the  existing  standard.  As  transactions  were  then  measured  by  the  commercial 
value  of  371 J  grains  of  silver,  he  reduced  the  gold  put  into  a  dollar  so  that  the 
grains  of  gold  which  made  a  dollar  should  have  the  commercial  value  of  the 
existing  measure  of  values,  the  grains  of  silver  put  into  a  dollar. 

President  Jackson  therefore  went  upon  record  in  favor  of  the  following 
propositions :  First,  that  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  and  gold  would  not 
increase  the  value  of  silver  bullion  5  per  cent.  ;  second,  that  with  the  silver 
bullion  put  into  a  dollar  commercially  worth  5  per  cent,  less  than  the  gold 
bullion  put  into  a  dollar,  bimetallism  could  not  exist,  but  silver  monometallism 


would  exist  ;  third,  that  it  was  advisable,  under  such  condition  of  affairs,  not 
to  continue  unlimited  coinage  of  both  metals  at  a  ratio  which  did  not  recognize 
the  commercial  value  of  the  bullion  put  into  a  dollar,  but  that  it  was  necessary 
to  change  the  ratio,  putting  in  more  grains  of  silver  in  proportion  to  the  grains 
of  gold  used  prior  to  that  date. 

16  TO  1  SECOND  RATIO  CAUSED  THE  GOLD  STANDARD. 

In  a  short  time  it  was  found  that  16  to  1  was  not  a  correct  ratio  between  the 
value  of  silver  and  gold,  but  that  16  grains  of  silver  were  worth  more  than  1 
grain  of  gold.  The  Gresham  law,  the  principle  for  which  I  am  contending,  at 
once  came  into  play  and  silver  went  out  of  circulation.  We  went  to  the  gold 
standard,  and  silver,  if  coined  at  all,  was  coined  for  exportation,  the  object 
being  simply  to  designate  by  the  stamp  of  the  Government  the  fact  that  a  piece 
of  silver  bullion  marked  a  dollar  had  371 J  grains  of  silver  in  it.  A  silver  dollar 
could  be  melted  down  and  sold,  when  melted,  for  about  three  cents  more  than 
its  value  as  coined  money.  This  fact  caused  great  scarcity  in  small  change, 
because  even  the  half  dollars  and  the  quarters  were  worth  more  for  bar  silver 
than  for  money  at  their  coined  value.  In  1853  it  became,  therefore,  necessary 
to  lessen  the  amount  of  silver  put  into  halves  and  quarters  so  that  they  would 
not  be  melted  into  bar  silver.  This  was  done,  and  all  silver  of  denominations 
less  than  a  dollar  after  1853  were  made  subsidiary  silver.  That  is  to  say,  they 
were  good  for  the  payment  of  debts  only  to  a  limited  amount,  namely,  five 
dollars.  No  man  could  compel  another  to  accept  eleven  silver  half  dollars  in 
payment  of  five  dollars  and  a  half  of  debts  or  in  payment  of  any  sum  above 
five  dollars.  In  1876  subsidiary  silver  was  made  legal  tender  to  the  amount  of  $10. 

CHANGES   OF   1853   AND   1857. 

The  reports  of  the  Treasury  Department  show  that  practically  none  of  the 
silver  coined  in  the  United  States  prior  to  1853  was  left  in  circulation,  but  that 
whether  it  consisted  of  pieces  of  the  denominations  of  one  dollar,  or  fifty  cents , 
or  less,  it  had  been  melted  down  into  bar  silver,  being  more  valuable  for  com- 
mercial purposes  than  for  money  when  coined.  During  this  time,  however, 
more  or  less  of  foreign  silver  remained  in  circulation.  The  highest  volume  of 
this  silver,  at  any  one  time,  has  been  estimated  by  the  treasury  department 
officers,  and  is  fixed  at  $50,000,000.  In  1857  the  foreign  silver  was  demonetized 
and  the  coin  currency  of  the  United  States  was  left  to  consist  of  gold  and  of 
subsidiary  silver.  In  addition  to  the  coin,  bank  notes  were  used  as  money. 
During  the  war,  large  quantities  of  treasury  notes — promises  by  the  Govern- 
ment to  pay  on  demand — were  issued.  They  were  generally  known  as  green- 
backs. Gold  remained  the  standard,  but  greenbacks  constituted  the  circulating 
medium.  In  1873  all  provision  for  the  coinage  of  legal  tender  silver  dollars  was 
omitted  from  the  act  revising  and  amending  the  laws  relative  to  mints  and  coin- 
age in  the  United  States.  This  act,  however,  continued  the  coinage  of  sub- 
sidiary silver,  and  subsidiary  silver  has  been  coined  as  freely  since  1873  and  con- 
tinues to  be  coined  as  freely  now  as  it  ever  has  been  since  the  act  of  1853. 

THE  ACT   OF   1873. 

There  are  many  important  and  valuable  provisions  applicable  to  the  mints 
and  to  coinage  in  the  act  of  1873.  It  is  no  doubt  true  that  there  were  congress- 
men who  did  not  know  all  of  its  provisions.  I  do  not  care  to  discuss  the  cir- 


6 

cumstances  under  -which  the  act  became  a  law.  The  debate  upon  its  passage 
was  elaborate  ;  but  even  if  the  provisions  of  the  act  were  misunderstood  by 
some,  there  is  no  reason  why  we  should  now  adopt  the  system  which  existed 
prior  to  that  time  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  by  adopting  it  benefits  will  accrue 
to  the  public.  Certainly  this  is  no  reason  if  by  its  adoption  injury  would  come 
to  the  public. 

PRESENT   CONDITION   OF   OTJR   SILVER  COIN. 

By  the  act  of  1874  silver  was  demonetized,  but  in  1878  the  act  of  1874  was 
repealed,  silver  was  remonetized,  and  under  the  terms  of  the  Bland- Allison  act 
we  began  the  coinage  of  $2,000,000  of  silver  each  month,  every  dollar  of  which 
is  full  legal  tender.  This  was  kept  up  until  1890,  when  the  Sherman  purchasing 
act  was  passed  as  a  substitute  for  the  Bland-Allison  act.  By  the  Sherman  pur- 
chasing act  the  United  States  bought  4,500,000  ounces  of  silver  bullion  each 
month.  The  silver  purchased  under  this  last  act  was  not  all  coined,  but  treasury 
notes  were  issued  against  it.  Under  these  two  laws  we  have  coined,  since  1878, 
423,289,000  standard  silver  dollars,  which  are  full  legal  tender,  good  for  the 
payment  of  every  debt.  We  have  issued  146,088,000  United  States  treasury 
notes,  based  upon  silver  bullion  now  in  the  treasury,  that  furnished  an  additional 
currency  based  upon  siver.  This  bullion  when  coined  will  furnish  about 
$50,000,000  additional  silver,  besides  being  sufficient  to  redeem  the  United 
States  treasury  notes  based  upon  it.  About  $12,000,000  of  the  treasury  notes 
based  upon  this  silver  bullion,  have  been  taken  up  and  canceled  by  the  present 
secretary  of  the  treasury  and  silver  dollars  issued  in  their  stead. 

When  we  began  the  coinage  of  silver  dollars  under  the  act  of  1878,  37l£ 
grains  of  silver  were  worth  almost  100  cents  and  it  was  confidently  believed 
that  a  large  use  of  silver  by  the  United  States  would  carry  the  value  of  371 J 
grains  of  silver  up  to  a  dollar.  This  hope  was  not  realized,  and  even  with  the 
enormous  increase  of  purchase  of  silver  by  the  Sherman  act  of  1890,  silver  fell 
from  1890  to  the  present  time  about  40  per  cent. ,  until  the  silver  contained  in  a 
dollar  is  now  worth  only  half  a  dollar.  By  the  credit  of  the  Government  the  silver 
dollars  are  maintained  equal  to  the  gold  dollars.  The  strain  upon  the  treasury 
in  part  from  this  burden  became  so  great  that  general  distrust  was  caused,  and 
in  1893  it  was  necessary  to  suspend  the  further  accumulation  of  silver  bullion  in 
the  treasury,  and  the  purchasing  clause  of  the  Sherman  law  was  repealed. 

SILVER  MONET  IN   1873,    AND   SILVER  MONET  NOW. 

In  1873,  when  the  act  so  much  denounced  was  passed,  there  was  no  silver 
in  circulation  in  the  United  States,  and  the  only  silver  coin  in  the  United  States 
consisted  of  subsidiary  silver,  amounting  to  $17,000,000.  There  is  now 
$76,772,000  of  subsidiary  silver  coin.  The  coinage  of  subsidiary  silver  has 
never  been  suspended  and  the  mints  are  increasing  the  volume  of  subsidiary 
coin  more  rapidly  at  the  present  time  than  at  almost  any  other  period  of  our 
history,  so  that  in  considering  the  effect  of  the  legislation  of  1873,  we  can 
eliminate  the  question  of  subsidiary  coin,  because  we  have  more  of  it  to-day,  by 
far,  than  ever  before  in  the  history  of  our  country,  and  it  will  continue  to  in- 
crease in  volume  just  as  fast  as  it  is  needed  or  called  for  at  the  treasury. 

There  were  no  silver  dollars  in  circulation  in  1873.  They  had  formed  no 
part  of  our  currency  since  1834.  Only  8,031,000  silver  dollars  had  been  coined 
from  1792  to  1873  ;  $76,734,964  of  fractional  silver  had  been  coined  prior  to 


1853,  when  fractional  silver  was  made  subsidiary  ;  but,  as  before  stated,  the 
cause  of  the  legislation  in  1853,  which  made  fractional  silver  subsidiary  and 
reduced  the  amount  of  silver  bullion  put  into  fractional  silver,  was  the  fact 
that  the  fractional  silver  already  coined  contained  silver  bullion  worth  more 
than  the  face  of  the  coin,  and  it  was  melted  down  into  bar  silver  or  shipped 
out  of  the  country,  so  that  it  formed  no  part  of  the  actual  money  used  in  the 
United  States. 

What,  then,  has  been  the  change,  so  far  as  silver  is  concerned,  since  1873  ? 

From  1834=  to  1873  we  had  no  silver  actually  in  circulation  except  $50,000,000 
of  foreign  coin,  which  was  demonetized  in  1857,  and  the  subsidiary  fractional 
currency  coined  after  the  act  of  1853.  In  the  last  twenty  years  we  have  in- 
creased the  subsidiary  silver  to  four  times  as  much  as  we  had  then,  and  we  have 
coined  423,289,000  standard  silver  dollars  of  full  legal  tender.  Of  these  stand- 
ard silver  dollars  397,000,000  are  in  circulation  among  the  people.  Either  the 
silver  dollars  themselves  are  circulating,  or  else  silver  certificates  are  circulating 
in  place  of  the  dollars,  the  silver  certificates  being  simply  receipts  for  the  silver 
dollars,  payable  at  the  treasury  with  silver  dollars  only,  and  issued  on  account 
of  the  fact  that  they  can  be  handled  with  much  more  ease  than  actual  silver, 
especially  when  amounts  are  large. 

So  it  will  be  seen  that  under  the  legislation  which  has  followed  the  act  of  '73, 
the  people  have  been  given  an  opportunity  to  use  infinitely  more  silver  than 
was  ever  in  circulation  in  the  United  States  prior  to  1873.  I  repeat  that  the 
standard  silver  dollars  are  still  full  legal-tender  dollars,  and  the  subsidiary  silver 
is  still  being  coined  just  as  rapidly  as  at  any  time  since  1853 


The  coined  gold  in  the  United  States  now  in  the  treasury  and  in  circulation 
amounts  to  $678,569,000.  The  gold  and  silver  of  full  legal  tender  amounts  to 
$1,110,848,000.  There  was  no  silver  of  full  legal  tender  in  1873,  and  the  gold 
coin  at  that  time  amounted  to  only  8135,000,000.  It  is  thus  seen  that  the  money 
of  ultimate  payment  in  the  United  States  at  the  present  time  is  eight  times  as 
much  as  it  was  in  1873.  The  paper  money,  including  bank  notes,  in  '73,  was 
about  equal  to  the  amount  now  in  use. 

No  one  can  claim  that  the  volume  of  business  in  this  country  has  increased 
since  1873  as  rapidly  as  the  volume  of  money  has  increased.  If  we  make  the 
per  capita  comparison,  in  1873  it  was  between  $18  and  $19.  Now  it  is  $24.  Or, 
going  back  to  1860,  it  was  $14 ;  in  1850,  $12. 

The  per  capita  of  silver  is  now  $9.08.  It  was  never  so  much  before  in  the 
history  of  the  United  States.  Nor  has  any  country  -which  allows  free  and 
unlimited  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver  so  much  silver  per  capita  as  the 
United  States.  Mexico  has  only  $4.13  ;  Japan,  $2.14. 

NO  CONTRACTION  OF  CURRENCY. 

The  facts  that  I  have  given  show  that  there  has  been  no  contraction  of  the 
money  of  final  payment  in  the  United  States  since  1873,  but  that  both  the  vol- 
ume in  proportion  to  the  business  and  the  per  capita  is  larger  and  has  been 
larger  for  the  past  few  years  than  at  any  time  during  our  prior  history.  If 
financial  troubles  have  come  upon  the  country  it  will  not  do  to  accept  the  first 
suggestion  as  their  cause,  or  the  first  remedy  proposed  as  their  cure.  A  patient 


may  be   sick  ;  proof  that  lie  is  sick  does  not  show  conclusively  that  the  first 
medicine  suggested  by  a  quack  doctor  will  certainly  give  a  cure. 

The  currency  of  the  United  States  has  been  contracted  during  the  past  few 
years;  but  to  understand  this  contraction,  it  is  necessary  to  bear  in  mind  that 
95  per  cent,  of  business  transactions  are  conducted  by  the  use  of  checks  and 
drafts,  of  bills  of  exchange  and  bills  of  credit.  Only  about  five  per  cent, 
use  actual  money  for  the  purpose  of  making  exchanges.  Confidence  is  the 
basis  of  credit.  Destroy  it,  and  contraction  and  panic  must  necessarily  follow. 
With  the  cessation  of  credit  as  the  basis  of  exchange,  follows  also  a  timidity 
about  the  use  of  actual  money.  Investment  ceases  and  money  becomes  in- 
active. Inflation  is  the  quack  remedy  for  inactivity  on  the  part  of  money;  if 
accepted  by  the  patient  it  would  increase  his  fever  and  probably  kill  him.  The 
restoration  of  confidence  is  the  medicine  which  the  trained  physician  will  give, 
and  if  the  patient  takes  it  he  must  only  wait  a  reasonable  time  for  his  gradual 
and  certain  recovery. 

MONEY   AND   ITS   USE. 

It  is  well  to  keep  in  mind  the  fact  that  the  only  object  of  money  is  to  enable 
the  man  who  has  something  he  does  not  care  to  keep  to  swap  it  off  and  get 
something  that  he  would  rather  have.  You  swap  your  cotton  for  money  that 
you  may  swap  that  money  for  something  you  need  at  home,  for  better  agricul- 
tural implements,  or,  perhaps,  for  more  land. 

The  money  which  you  take,  when  you  give  up  that  which  you  do  not  desire 
to  keep,  should  be  of  such  fixed  value  that  it  will  be  worth  just  as  much  when 
you  wish  to  swap  it  off  and  get  something  you  intend  to  keep,  as  when  you 
received  it.  It  also  should  be  in  such  shape  as  to  make  it  easy  for  transporta- 
tion and  convenient  to  handle.  It  must  have  a  fixed  value,  a  recognized  value, 
so  that  the  men  with  whom  you  desire  to  exchange  the  money  will  recognize  it 
just  as  you  recognized  it  when  you  took  it  in  exchange  for  the  thing  you  sold. 

A  great  many  different  kinds  of  moneys  have  been  used — shells,  skins, 
tobacco.  At  one  time  cows  were  used  as  money  because  they  could  be  shipped 
and  had  a  recognized  value.  A  man  would  buy  a  piece  of  land  for  so  many 
cows,  payable  in  the  fall.  Shrewd  men  sought  to  relieve  themselves  somewhat 
of  the  burden  of  promises  to  pay,  and  got  into  the  habit,  after  making  contracts 
for  the  purchase  of  something  which  was  to  be  paid  for  in  the  future  by  so 
many  cows,  of  stopping  the  feed  of  the  cows.  They  paid  the  cows  as  promised 
but  allowed  their  value  to  decrease.  This  was  carried  to  such  an  extent 
that  a  law  was  passed  forbidding  men  to  pay  their  debts  in  "lean  kine." 

The  early  settlers  of  Virginia  bought  their  cattle,  and  sometimes,  it  is  even 
claimed,  their  wives,  with  tobacco,  at  so  much  a  pound.  The  tobacco  was  used 
as  money  because  it  had  a  recognized  value.  A  pound  of  tobacco  was  worth  a 
fixed  sum,  and  this  recognized  value  made  it  useful  as  money  as  a  medium  of 
exchange. 

The  stamp  does  not  make  the  value  of  the  money.  Suppose  some  bright 
trader  had  marked  two  pounds  on  one  pound  of  tobacco  ?  Do  you  suppose 
that  the  mark  would  have  given  to  the  pound  of  tobacco  any  more  exchange- 
able power  ?  Suppose  when  skins  were  used  as  money  some  one  had  marked 
"t\vo  skins  "on  one  skin,  do  you  suppose  the  two-skin  stamp  would  have 
added  to  the  exchangeable  quality  or  the  purchasing  power  of  the  single  skin  ? 
Yet  the  extreme  silver  people  wish  silver  in  unlimited  quantities  stamped  one 


hundred  cents  -when  only  worth  50  cents.  They  wish  to  remove  the  credit  of 
the  Government  from  the  silver  dollar  to  let  it  rest  simply  u pon  its  bullion  value, 
and  stamp  upon  a  piece  of  silver  bullion  twice  its  actual  value.  The  stamp 
would  increase  the  value  of  the  bullion,  under  such  circumstances,  about  as 
much  as  the  stamp  of  "two  skins  "  on  the  single  skin  would  have  increased  the 
purchasing  power  of  the  one  skin  when  skins  were  used  fcr  money. 

Another  illustration,  familiar  to  all  of  you,  is  found  in  the  history  of  the 
money  issued  by  the  Confederate  States.  At  first  all  notes  or  paper  money 
were  good  for  their  face  value,  as  perfect  confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  Con- 
federate States  to  pay  their  promises  existed.  But  as  the  war  went  on,  and  as 
it  became  impossible  for  the  treasury  of  the  Confederate  States  to  give  some- 
thing of  actual  value  for  these  paper  promises  to  pay  when  they  were  presented 
at  the  treasury,  they  became  depreciated  and  fell,  first  a  small  per  cent.,  then 
a  larger  and  a  larger  per  cent. ,  until  finally  men  paid  five  hundred  dollars  for  a 
saucer  of  ice-cream  or  for  a  cigar.  Now  the  notes  are  utterly  worthless.  They 
were  valuable  at  first  because  the  Government  was  supposed  to  be  able  to  give 
something  of  actual  value  in  settlement  of  its  promises.  They  became  less  and 
less  valuable  as  this  prospect  grew  less  and  less,  and  finally  became  of  no  value 
when  the  prospect  was  gone. 

While  the  failing  credit  of  the  confederacy  left  its  paper  money  worthless, 
a  German,  living  nearDahlonega,  coined  on  his  own  account  gold,  and  his  stamp 
upon  five  dollars  of  gold  gave  it  circulation  through  north  Georgia.  Although 
he  is  dead,  the  coins  are  still  worth  their  face,  for  the  gold  is  in  them. 

UNITED   STATES  MONET. 

Our  money  consists  of  gold,  silver  and  paper.  The  paper  is  the  promise  of 
the  Government  to  pay  in  coin,  or  else  receipts  for  the  deposit  of  gold  or  silver, 
together  with  bank  notes.  The  paper  money,  no  matter  of  what  denomination, 
is  a  promise  to  give  something  of  actual  value,  and  so  long  as  the  holders  of 
this  paper  money  know  that  on  demand  they  can  get  the  something  of  actual 
value  by  calling  for  it,  the  paper  money  is  as  good  as  the  coined  money — the 
thing  of  actual  value — and  is  not  presented  for  redemption. 

The  gold  coin  is  simply  the  stamp  of  the  Government  upon  so  many  grains 
of  gold.  The  grains  unstamped  are  worth  as  much  as  they  are  stamped.  You 
can  take  a  ten-dollar  gold  coin  and  melt  it  down  and  get  ten  dollars  for  it  after 
it  is  melted.  It  is  good  the  world  over  for  ten  dollars  because  the  stamp  tells 
the  truth — it  says  that  the  Government  has  coined  ten  dollars'  worth  of  gold,  and 
as  it  really  has  coined  ten  dollars'  worth  of  gold,  the  credit  of 
the  Government  is  not  needed  to  keep  the  coin  good.  The  thing  has 
its  actual  value,  uncoined,  and,  therefore,  has  the  same  value  after  it  is 
coined.  This  is  the  kind  of  money  which  Jefferson  and  Jackson,  Crawford, 
Benton,  Cobb  and  Hill  advocated. 

Our  silver  money  rests  in  part  upon  the  credit  of  the  Government.  It  is  not 
an  ideal  money.  Every  silver  dollar  ought  to  have  one  hundred  cents'  worth 
of  silver  bullion  in  it,  but  in  1834  we  adopted  the  ratio  of  16  to  1.  In  1878  it 
was  believed  that  the  volume  we  proposed  to  coin  would  carry  371 1-4  grains 
of  silver  up  to  par  ;  we  coined  nearly  $400,000,000  under  the  act  of  1878. 
Silver  did  not  go  to  par,  and  we  more  than  doubled  the  amount  we  were  using 
by  the  provisions  of  the  act  of  '90  for  the  purchase  of  4,500,000  ounces  of  silver 
a  month.  We  continued  the  ratio  of  16  to  1,  hoping  by  this  large  increase  of 


10 

demand  for  silver  to  carry  it  to  par.  This  experiment  also  failed,  and  the 
failure,  as  before  Stated,  began  to  fill  the  country  with  distrust  of  the  power  of 
the  Government  to  keep  the  silver  dollar,  intrinsically  worth  less  than  a  dollar, 
from  dropping  below  its  coinage  face  value  to  its  intrinsical  bullion  value. 

HOW  THE  GOVERNMENT  SUSTAINS  THE  SILVER  DOLLAR  WITH  THE  GOLD  DOLLAR. 

I  have  stated  that  we  have,  in  round  numbers,  400,000,000  of  silver  dollars,  of 
full  legal  tender,  in  actual  circulation  among  the  people,  besides  the  subsidiary 
silver.  The  Government  collects  each  year  about  8500,000,000  of  revenue.  It 
says  to  the  people,  you  can  pay  to  the  Government  anything  you  owe  in  silver 
dollars  at  their  coinage  value.  The  Government  stamped  them  and  allowed 
them  put  among  the  people  as  good.  The  Government  is  ready  to  take  them 
at  the  value  which  it  fixed  upon  them  when  they  were  coined.  On  the  other 
hand,  when  the  Government  owes  money,  it  has  pursued  the  practice  since  1878 
of  saying  to  those  it  owes,  that  the  silver  dollar  and  the  gold  dollar  have  each 
received  the  stamp  of  the  Government,  declaring  their  value,  and  the  Govern- 
ment declines  to  discriminate  between  them.  It  will  not  say  to  you,  you  must 
take  one  or  the  other.  As  the  Government  maintains  them  equally  good,  it  lets 
you  have,  when  it  owes  you,  whichever  you  prefer.  Thus  the  credit  of  the  Gov- 
ernment has  been  placed  behind  the  silver  dollar  to  keep  it  as  good  as  its  face 
value.  To  preserve  the  ability  of  the  Government  to  sustain  the  credit  of  the 
silver  dollars  which  it  coins,  it  has  been  necessary  for  the  Government  to  buy  the 
bullion  at  the  market  price,  and  to  take  the  difference  between  the  amount  act- 
ually put  into  a  dollar,  374£  grains  of  silver,  and  the  amount  of  silver  which  is 
bought  with  a  dollar.  It  was  necessary  to  limit  the  quantity  of  these  dollars 
which  the  Government  put  out,  or  else  the  volume  would  become  so  great  that 
the  financial  resources  of  the  Government  could  not  carry  the  burden  of  sus- 
taining the  dollars  at  their  face  value. 

The  repeal  of  the  purchasing  clause  of  the  Sherman  law  was  necessary,  be- 
cause the  quantity  of  these  dollars  was  becoming  so  large,  increasing  each  month 
at  the  rate  of  4,500,000  ounces  of  silver,  that  confidence  in  the  strength  of  the 
Government  to  sustain  these  dollars  was  beginning  to  be  shaken,  and  with  that 
fact  came  a  distrust  of  our  entire  currency  system. 

Congress,  therefore,  repea  ed  the  purchasing  clause  of  the  Sherman  law, 
and  for  a  time  the  purchase  of  silver  bullion,  except  for  subsidiary  silver  coin- 
age, has  been  suspended.  The  treasury  is  coining  the  silver  bullion  now  in 
the  treasury,  bought  under  the  act  of  '90,  as  fast  as  the  coined  dollars  are 
absorbed  in  business,  and  the  United  States  treasury  notes  are  being  redeemed 
with  this  silver.  The  process  will  continue  as  rapidly  as  practicable  until  the 
entire  amount  of  silver  bullion  now  in  the  treasury  is  coined  and  the  United 
States  treasury  notes  have  all  been  redeemed.  The  seigniorage  which  will 
result  from  this  coinage  will,  together  with  the  dollars  used  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  the  treasury  notes,  carry  our  actual  silver  circulation  up  to  over  $600,- 
000,000.  But  the  silver  dollar  has  been  kept  good,  as  heretofore  explained,  by 
the  credit  of  the  Government,  and  the  credit  of  the  Government  has  been 
able  to  sustain  the  silver  dollars,  because  the  quantity  coined  was  limited. 
The  proposition  of  the  extreme  silver  people  is  to  take  down  the  limit,  to  open 
the  mints  to  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  dollars  with  371J  grains  of  silver 
in  each  dollar,  although  the  bullion  is  worth  only  fifty  cents.  They  propose  to 
withdraw  from  the  support  of  our  silver  dollars  the  very  thing  which  has  kept 
them  good. 


11 

It  is  this  proposition  which  I  am  opposing,  not  for  the  purpose  of  striking 
down  silver,  but  for  the  purpose  of  preventing  the  extreme  silver  men  from 
striking  down  our  silver  dollars. 

ALLEGED   APPKECIATION   OF   GOLD FALL    IN    SILVER    HAS   NOT   REDUCED  VALUE  OF 

COMMODITIES. 

The  extreme  silver  advocates  contend  that  gold  has  appreciated  in  value, 
and  that  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  is  necessary  to  overcome  the  depre- 
ciation in  the  value  of  products  by  reason  of  the  appreciation  of  gold.  I  have 
already  shown  that  the  sale  of  property  for  money  is  a  mere  exchange  of  a 
thing  of  value  for  something  else  of  value.  If  gold  has  appreciated,  then  when 
I  exchange  a  thing  which  has  not  changed  in  value,  for  gold,  I  would  expect  to 
receive  less  gold  than  prior  to  the  time  when  gold  appreciated.  If  23.22  grains 
of  gold  are  worth  more  to-day  than  they  were  twenty  years  ago,  then  I  would 
not  expect  to  receive  as  many  grains  of  gold  for  my  labor  as  I  received 
at  that  time  unless  my  labor  had  itself  appreciated  in  value 
also.  But  if  we  compare  the  prices  of  labor  at  the  present 
time  with  those  of  twenty  years  ago,  we  find  that  an  advance  of 
12  per  cent,  has  been  made  under  the  gold  standard  in  the  average  wages  of 
employees.  While  commodities  have  averaged  a  fall  of  20  per  cent. ,  the  heav- 
iest declines  have  been  in  those  lines  which  the  masses  of  the  people  buy,  and 
these  reductions  can  be  attributed  to  a  lessened  cost  of  production  and  to  the 
recent  panic.  While  commodities  have  fallen  20  per  cent.,  silver  has  fallen  50 
per  cent.  In  1873  corn  sold  for  41  cents  a  bushel ;  silver  was  worth  $1.31  an 
ounce.  In  1895  corn  sold  for  52  cents  and  silver  is  worth  66  cents  an  ounce. 
Silver  has  fallen  50  per  cent,  and  corn  has  risen  25  per  cent.  In  1873  wheat  was 
worth  §1.17  a  bushel  and  silver  $1.31  an  ounce.  In  1878  wheat  was  worth  31.34 
a  bushel,  silver  81.15  an  ounce.  In  1889,  wheat,  90  cents,  silver,  $1.04;  1895, 
wheat,  85  cents  and  silver  66  cents. 

COTTON  AS  INFLUENCED  BY  SILVEB. 

Cotton  is  the  product  in  which  you  are  directly  interested.  The  claim  that 
the  value  of  cotton  has  been  depreciated  by  the  rise  in  gold  or  the  fall  of 
silver  has  been  shown  this  year  to  be  without  foundation.  Cotton  in  the  last 
four  months  has  risen  30  per  cent.  ;  silver,  only  5  per  cent.  Prior  to  1873  the 
price  of  cotton  varied  from  4  to  40  cents  per  pound.  Silver  never  fell  below 
§1.29  an  ounce.  In  1845  cotton  sold  for  4  cents  and  silver  was  then  worth  $1.30 
an  ounce. 

QUANTITY  OF  GOLD. 

There  has  been  an  enormous  increase  in  the  production  of  gold  during  the 
last  four  years.  Last  year  the  world's  product  of  gold  amounted  to  §181, 500, 000. 
This  was  the  largest  quantity  of  gold  ever  mined  in  any  one  year  in  the  world's 
history.  Keports  already  received  for  the  present  year  indicate  that  the  output 
of  gold  will  amount  to  §200,000,000  this  year.  The  discovery  of  large  gold 
deposits  and  new  machinery  recently  invented  for  the  purpose  of  mining  gold 
will  have  the  tendency  to  lessen  very  much  the  cost  of  producing  it,  to  increase 
the  volume  of  the  product,  and  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  its  becoming  too 
scarce  to  perform  its  part  as  money  for  the  world.  Besides,  it  must  be  borne 
in  mind  that  even  in  those  countries  thai?  adhere  to  the  gold  standard  a  large 


12 

amount  of  silver  is  being  used,  sustained  in  part  by  the  credit  of  the  Govern- 
ments, but  which  nevertheless  lessens  the  demand  upon  gold  as  money  of  final 
payment.  The  world's  coinage  in  gold  for  1893  rose  to  $232,785,000  and  that  of 
silver  to  $135,389,000,  making  the  largest  yearly  original  coinage  in  the  world's 
history.  The  world's  stock  in  full  legal-tender  gold  and  silver  to-day  is  by  the 
latest  statistics  $3,965,900,000  of  gold  and  $3,435,800,000  of  silver. 

DOUBTFUL  EXPERIMENTS  NOT  JUSTIFIED. 

I  present  these  facts  to  show  that  there  is  no  pressing  necessity  caused  by 
contraction  of  money  of  final  payment  which' can  justify  an  experiment  in  silver 
coinage  both  reckless  and  dangerous.  I  know  that  by  extreme  silver  men  the 
volume  of  debts  in  this  country  is  compared  with  the  volume  of  money,  and 
they  practically  claim  that  the  volume  of  money  should  equal  them.  This  con- 
tention is  so  foolish  that  it  scarcely  deserves  notice.  Everyone  must  know  that 
a  dollar  is  not  consumed  by  its  use  in  paying  a  debt.  The  same  dollar  is  capable 
of  making  innumerable  transactions.  A  pays  it  to  B,  B  to  C,  C  to  D,  and  so  on 
to  Z.  Z  may  pay  it  to  A.  It  would  serve  twenty-four  times  to  pay  debts  and 
return  again  to  A  just  as  ready  for  use  as  ever.  Besides,  95  per  cent,  of  transac- 
tions are  paid  by  checks  without  actual  money  being  used  at  all. 

WILL  SILVEK  BULLION  KISE   OE   SILVEE  DOLLAES  FALL  ? 

But  the  extreme  free  silver  advocates  contend  that  the  unlimited  coinage  of 
silver  will  enhance  the  value  of  silver  bullion  put  into  a  dollar  aud  make  it 
worth  a  dollar.  They  say  that,  so  soon  as  you  give  the  unlimited  right  to  every 
371i  grains  of  silver  to  be  coined  without  charge  into  a  dollar,  371  £  grains  of 
silver  will  be  interchangeable  with  a  coined  silver  dollar,  and  that  therefore 
silver  will  appreciate  in  value  at  once  to  its  coinage  ratio.  I  admit  that,  when 
371i  grains  of  silver  is  allowed  to  be  coined  in  unlimited  quantities  and  free  of 
charge  into  dollars,  then  371 J-  grains  of  silver  will  be  worth  uncoined  as  much 
as  the  silver  dollar  coined  from  them,  but  the  dollar  would  be  worth  only  37l£ 
grains  of  silver.  My  contention  from  the  very  first  has  been,  not  that  the  silver 
put  into  a  dollar,  under  free,  unlimited  coinage,  would  be  worth  less  than  the 
dollar,  but  that  the  dollar  would  become  worth  no  more  than  the  bullion.  At 
the  present  time  one  of  our  silver  dollars  will  buy  two  Mexican  silver  dollars. 
Five  of  our  silver  dollars  can  be  exchanged  for  a  five-dollar  gold  piece.  At  pre- 
sent the  credit  of  the  Government  keeps  the  silver  dollar  up  to  twice  the  value 
of  the  bullion  put  into  it.  When  this  credit  is- withdrawn,  when  the  limit  now 
put  upon  the  amount  coined  is  also  removed,  will  the  silver  dollar  drop  to  its 
bullion  value  and  be  worth  no  more  than  the  Mexican  dollar,  and  will  it  take 
then  ten  silver  dollars  to  buy  one  five-dollar  gold  piece  ?  Of  course,  the  silver 
dollar  and  the  bullion  put  into  it,  with  free,  unlimited  coinage,  will  have  the 
same  value  ;  but  will  the  bullion  rise  or  the  dollar  fall  ? 

The  grains  now  proposed  to  be  put  into  a  dollar  are  371i.  If  you  reduce 
the  number  to  a  hundred  grains,  if  you  reduce  the  number  to  ten  grains — yes, 
if  you  reduce  the  number  to  one  grain,  and  give  free,  unlimited  coinage,  the  one 
grain  uncoined  would  be  worth  an  American  dollar,  but  the  American  dollar 
would  be  worth  no  more  than  the  one  grain.  If  you  adopt  chips  and  allow  any 
one  with  a  chip  one-eighth  of  an  inch  thick  and  an  inch  in  diameter  to  have 
it  coined  or  stamped  one  dollar,  without  charge  and  in  unlimited  quantities, 
the  chip  uncoined  or  unstamped  would  be  worth  as  much  as  the  dollar  after  it 


13 

is  stamped,  but  the  dollar  after  it  is  stamped  -would  be  worth  no  more  than  the 
chip.  This  argument  by  the  free  silver  people  throws  a  just  insight  into  their 
cause  and  shows  how  fallacious  is  their  entire  position.  The  question  really  is, 
what  effect  would  unlimited  coinage,  by  the  United  States  alone,  have  upon  the 
value  of  silver  bullion  ?  It,  of  course,  would  leave  the  bullion  worth  as  much 
as  our  silver  dollars,  but  unless  it  raised  the  value  of  silver  bullion  throughout 
the  world,  it  would  depreciate  the  value  of  our  new  dollars. 

THE  RE-ENACTMENT   OF  THE  LAW  PEIOB  TO  1873  WOULD  NOT  EESTOBE  SILVER. 

It  is  claimed  that  silver  was  struck  down  by  the  act  of  1873,  and  we  are 
urged  to  remove  the  blow  and  to  restore  silver.  If  our  action  was  the  sole 
cause  of  the  depreciation  of  silver,  and  if  the  restoration  of  the  legislation  which 
existed  in  the  United  States  prior  to  1873  would  put  silver  bullion  back  to  its 
former  value,  no  one  would  urge  more  earnestly  than  myself  the  legislation 
sought.  But  we  must  understand  the  history  of  the  fall  in  silver  before  we 
embark  in  so  wild  an  enterprise. 

ACTION  OF  OTHER  COUNTRIES. 

Between  1871  and  1872,  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark  and  Germany  passed 
legislation  which  went  into  effect  in  1873  and  1874,  by  which  silver  was  practi- 
cally demonetized  in  those  countries.  Subsequently  Holland,  Russia,  Austria, 
Hungary,  Belgium,  France,  Switzerland,  Italy,  Greece,  India,  Argentine 
Republic,  Brazil  and  Chili  demonetized  or  suspended  the  unlimited  coinage  of 
silver.  If  the  fall  of  silver  has  been  due  to  the  adverse  action  of  countries  which 
have  demonetized  or  suspended  the  coinage  of  silver,  then  it  has  been  the  result 
of  the  action  of  seventeen  countries  and  not  of  one.  The  reversal  of  such  action 
by  the  United  States,  or  restoration  by  the  United  States  of  the  law  in  force 
prior  to  1873,  would  remove  the  cause  of  that  fall  so  far  as  the  United  States  pro- 
duced that  fall,  but  it  would  not  remove  the  effect  of  the  action  of  the  balance 
of  the  countries.  If  all  of  these  causes  produced  the  fall,  it  would  be  utterly 
illogical  to  claim  that  the  removal  of  one  would  remove  the  effect  of  all.  The 
mere  examination  of  the  number  of  countries  which  have  acted  adversely  to 
silver  since  1873,  shows  that  the  action  of  the  United  States  could  have  been  but 
a  small  part  of  the  cause  of  the  fall  of  silver,  and  therefore  the  reversal  of  such 
action  could  but  in  small  part  restore  the  value  of  silver  bullion. 

INCREASED  PRODUCT  OF  SILVER. 

But  the  great  cause  of  the  fall  of  silver  is  probably  due,  not  to  the  action  of 
nations,  but  to  the  increase  of  the  amount  mined.  The  entire  quantity  of  sil- 
ver mined  during  the  year  1873  was  $81,000,000.  The  amount  mined  in  1894 
was  $214,000,000.  The  price  of  silver  had  fallen  50  per  cent.,  but  so  great  had 
been  the  reduction  of  the  cost  of  mining  silver,  by  the  use  of  new  mechanical 
contrivances,  and  so  much  had  the  cost  of  transporting  silver  to  market  been 
lessened  by  the  construction  of  new  railroads  in  the  United  States  and  in  Mex- 
ico  and  other  countries,  that  although  silver  fell  one-half  in  its  market  price,  the 
men  engaged  in  silver  mining  found  it  sufficiently  profitable  to  justify  them  in 
increasing  the  amount  produced  to  three  times  as  much  as  it  was  when  the  price 
was  twice  as  large. 

The  effort  to  raise  the  value  of  silver  involves  an  effort  to  raise  the  value  of 
all  that  may  be  mined.  If  silver  can  be  mined  at  a  profit  at  sixty-six  cents  an 


14 

ounce,  how  tremendous  will  be  the  quantity  mined  when  you  raise  the  value  of 
silver  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-nine  cents  an  ounce,  which  is  the  increase 
necessary  to  make  371  i  grains  of  silver  worth  a  dollar.  If  it  were  possible  to 
put  a  profit  on  silver  mining  largely  over  100  per  cent,  by  this  increase  in  the 
value  of  silver  bullion,  it  would  pay  the  money  and  energy  of  the  world  to  turn 
its  attention  from  everything  else  to  silver  mining,  and  the  output  would  sim- 
ply be  beyond  human  estimate. 

BTTLLJON  ALKEADY   COINED. 

Again,  the  coined  silver  now  in  the  world  amounts  to  $4,000,000,000.  About 
one-half  of  it  is  sustained  artificially  by  the  governments  coining  it,  at  its 
coinage  value,  just  as  the  United  States  sustains  the  $400,000,000  in  circulation 
here.  But  one-half  of  it  is  down  to  its  bullion  value.  Take  the  silver  of 
Mexico,  Japan,  China  and  the  little  South  American  states — their  silver  dol- 
lars have  dropped  from  coinage  value  to  bullion  value.  It  requires  740  grains 
of  Mexican  coined  silver  to  buy  one  dollar  of  silver  coined  by  the  United  States. 
When  we  raise  the  value  of  our  silver,  the  silver  of  the  world  must  increase  to 
the  same  price  which  silver  brings  in  the  United  States,  less  the  cost  of  trans- 
portation. When,  therefore,  we  undertake  by  unlimited  coinage  to  lift  the  value 
of  the  silver  bullion  to  put  into  our  dollar,  by  merely  opening  our  mints  to  its 
free  coinage,  to  twice  the  present  value  of  silver  bullion,  we  will  undertake 
at  once,  to  lift  the  value  of  $4,000,000,000  of  silver  bullion  already  coined 
throughout  the  world  to  twice  its  present  value,  as  well  as  to  lift  the  bullion 
dug  each  year  out  of  the  mines,  no  matter  how  great  it  may  be  in  volume.  To 
state  this  proposition  shows  how  ridiculous  is  the  contention  of  the  extreme 
silver  men. 

THE  "TBY  IT"  ABGUMENT. 

But  it  is  urged  that  we  should  try  it  and  see.  A  man  who  did  not  know  how 
to  swim  would  "be  foolish  to  jump  into  deep  water  and  try  to  see  how  it  would 
affect  him.  But  we  have  tried  it.  We  tried  it  from  1792  to  1834,  and  failed  to 
raise  the  price  of  silver  three  per  cent,  to  make  it  even  with  gold  at  the  ratio  of 
15  to  1.  We  tried  it  from  1834  to  1860,  and  failed  to  raise  the  price  of  gold 
bullion  between  3  and  5  per  cent,  to  make  it  equal  with  silver  at  the  ratio  of  16 
to  1.  In  1873  the  Latin  Union,  composed  of  France,  Belgium,  Italy,  Switzer- 
land and  Greece,  wedded  to  the  free  and  unlimited  coinage  of  silver,  found,  when 
Germany  threw  $300,000,000  of  silver  bullion  upon  the  market,  that  free  and 
unlimited  coinage  of  silver  by  their  mints  failed  to  keep  up  the  value  of  silver 
with  gold  at  the  ratio  at  which  they  were  coining  silver,  and  they  were  com- 
pelled, nmch  against  their  wishes,  to  suspend  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver 
year  by  year  for  four  years,  until  finally  they  indefinitely  suspended  it  in  1878. 
We  tried  it  and  failed.  They  tried  it  and  failed,  and  were  compelled  to 
quit  it. 

Mexico,  Japan,  and  the  other  countries  that  are  allowing  free  and  unlimited 
coinage,  to-day,  are  trying  it.  What  is  the  result  ?  Their  dollars  are  down  to 
the  bullion  value  of  silver — one-half  the  value  of  our  dollars.  History  and 
reason  both  demonstrate  the  fact  that  while  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  by  the 
United  States  alone  might  increase  somewhat  the  value  of  silver  bullion,  it 
would  be  entirely  impossible  to  lift  it  to  twice  its  present  value,  and-that  our 
new  dollar  would,  therefore,  fall  to  about  one-half  its  present  value,  and  be 


15 

depreciated  to  the  commercial  value  of  the  silver  put  into  it — to  the  standard 
of  the  Mexican  dollar. 

THE  UNITED   STATES   COULD   ACT   ALONE. 

We  are  told  the  United  States  is  a  great  country  ;  that  we  ought  not  to  be 
governed,  or  dictated  to,  by  Europe,  by  England  ;  that  we  should  establish  our 
own  system,  and  are  big  enough  to  do  it.  This  is  a  species  of  demagoguism 
which  enjoys  my  unlimited  contempt.  Of  course  we  could  establish  our  own 
system  independent  of  anybody  else.  We  could  adopt  iron  as  money  if  we 
wanted  to,  but  it  would  be  a  very  foolish  thing  to  do.  We  could  go  back  to 
cows,  skins  and  tobacco — this,  indeed,  would  be  the  money  of  our  forefathers  ; 
but  the  United  States  can  no  more  fix  absolutely  the  price  of  gold  and  silver, 
independent  of  the  balance  of  the  countries  of  the  world,  than  she  can  fix  the 
price  of  wool,  or  cotton,  or  machinery,  or  ship  transportation.  She  can  adopt 
any  system  she  pleases,  but  she  can't  make  16  ounces  of  silver  worth  1  ounce 
of  gold.  We  can  use  silver  alone,  or  anything  else  which  is  cheap,  as  money. 
We  can  tax  our  foreign  trade  by  a  high  tariff  or  in  any  other  way  we  wish.  We 
can  adopt  free,  unlimited,  independent  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1,  but  by  doing 
so  we  should  expect  the  logical  result  of  such  a  course.  We  would  use  nothing 
but  silver,  give  up  all  gold  and  depreciate  our  currency  one-half. 

DIFFICULTIES  WHICH   SURROUND   THE  DEMOCRATIC   ADMINISTRATION. 

When  Mr.  Cleveland  retired  as  president,  on  March  4, 1889,  he  left  the  treas- 
ury full  of  money,  a  large  surplus  having  been  caused  by  an  economic  admin- 
istration of  public  affairs  during  his  four  years  of  service.    When  he  returned 
to  office,  four  years  later,  he  found  the  surplus  practically  squandered,  the  tariff 
taxation  increased  by  the  passage  of  the  McKinley  bill,  and  appropriations  made 
for  the  ensuing  year  amounting  to  $90,000,000  in  excess  of  the  revenue  which 
could  be  raised  by  the  existing  legislation.     Gold  had  been  leaving  the  United 
States  in  great  quantities  ;  the  large  increase  of  silver  had  created  a  distrust  lest 
the  credit  of  the  Government  would  not  be  strong  enough  to  keep  a  dollar  con- 
taining fifty  cents'  worth  of  bullion  in  circulation  at  double  its  bullion  value. 
Twelve  millions  of  dollars  ($12,000,000)  had  left  the  United  States  per  month 
during  the  last  three  months  of  the  Harrison  administration,  and  already  the 
republican  administration,  recognizing  the  condition  of  the  treasury,  had  pre- 
pared for  the  issue  of  bonds  to  sustain  it  against  their  own  mismanagement.   All 
over  the  country  people  were  out  of  employment,  manufactories  were  closing 
and  prices  were  becoming  depressed.     No  democrat  will  charge  these  condi- 
tions upon  a  democratic  administration.     They  were  burdens  it  was  compelled 
to  carry  for  which  it  was  not  responsible. 

THE   PANIC   OF   1893. 

The  panic  of  1893  came  upon  us,  as  panics  have  come  periodically,  about 
every  twenty  years,  and  as  they  will  continue  to  come  in  the  future  ;  but  it  was 
made  more  severe,  on  account  of  the  fact  that  we  were  living  under  a  system 
of  high-tariff  taxation,  which  absorbed  the  money  that  should  have  been  dis- 
tributed among  the  masses  for  their  labor,  and  put  it  in  the  pockets  of  a  few 
protected  classes.  It  was  made  worse  on  account  of  the  fact  that  the  enormous 
volume  of  silver  which  had  been  put  in  circulation,  coupled  with  the  weakened 


16 

condition  of  the  national  treasury,  created  great  doubt  lest  the  credit  of  the 
Government  would  not  be  strong  enough  to  keep  silver  in  circulation  at  its 
face  value.  At  the  instance  of  a  democratic  administration  the  purchasing 
clause  of  the  Sherman  law  was  repealed  and  the  burden  of  keeping  additional 
silver  at  twice  its  actual  value  in  circulation  was  removed  from  the  Government. 
The  McKinley  law  has  been  repealed,  and  a  new  tariff  bill,  though  not  satis- 
factory, infinitely  better  than  those  of  previous  years,  has  become  a  law.  Busi- 
ness, in  the  mean  time,  however,  had  become  thoroughly  prostrate,  thousands 
of  men  had  been  thrown  out  of  employment  and  want  and  suffering  spread  over 
the  land.  But  with  the  removal  of  two  great  causes,  business  began  somewhat 
to  revive.  It  was  checked  for  a  while  by  the  unwise  effort  to  pass  through 
congress  legislation  in  favor  of  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver.  Limited  coin- 
age of  silver  had  helped  to  prostrate  the  business  of  the  country  ;  unlimited 
coinage  would  have  destroyed  it.  The  democratic  administration,  in  the  mean 
time,  was  called  upon  to  meet  demand  notes,  known  as  greenbacks.  The  gen- 
eral distrust  had  caused  the  holders  of  these  paper  promises  'to  pay  of  the 
Government  to  call  for  something  of  actual  value  in  their  place. 

The  administration  has  been  criticised  for  issuing  bonds  in  time  of  peace. 
The  bonds  were  issued  to  meet  demand  notes  issued  in  time  of  war.  But  even 
had  it  been  otherwise  it  would  have  been  better,  if  the  expenses  of  the  Gov- 
ernment were  temporarily  greater  than  the  receipts,  to  have  borrowed  money 
at  a  low  rate  of  interest  to  have  met  those  expenses,  rather  than  to  have  levied 
additional  taxes  upon  the  people  when  money  could  only  have  been  obtained  by 
the  public  at  great  expense.  The  adjournment  of  Congress  relieved  the  public 
mind  from  fear  of  further  silver  legislation.  The  courageous  action  of  the 
democratic  president  and  secretary  of  the  treasury  in  issuing  bonds  to  pre- 
serve the  credit  of  the  Government,  restored  confidence  to  a  great  extent,  and 
business  at  once  revived.  Manufactories  all  over  the  country  have  again  opened  ; 
thousands  of  men  who  have  been  idle  are  at  work  ;  the  wages  of  more  than 
a  million  of  laboring  men  have  been  voluntarily  increased,  the  two  great  causes 
which  intensified  the  panic  of  1893  have  been  removed,  and  there  is  every  reason 
to  believe  that  we  have  entered  upon  the  onward  march  toward  a  degree  of 
prosperity  never  before  known  in  this  country. 

It  is  true  that  agricultural  products  have  not  been  returned  to  the  full  prices 
which  they  brought  a  few  years  back,  but  there  is  a  tendency  to  improve  all 
along  the  line,  and  as  the  immediate  responsibilities  incurred  by  reason  of 
months  of  idleness  have  been  met,  the  masses  will  be  able  to  wear  more  and  bet- 
ter clothes,  to  eat  more  and  better  food,  and  all  the  products  of  our  country  will 
feel  the  effects  of  prosperous  times. 

I  do  not  mean  that  I  am  opposed  to  further  legislation  in  the  direction  of 
improving  the  financial  system  of  the  United  States.  I  am  in  favor  of  it. 

The  secretary  of  the  treasury  sent  to  congress  a  plan  which  would  have 
furnished  an  elastic  currency.  It  embraced  the  repeal  of  the  ten  per  cent,  tax 
on  state  banks.  The  president  indorsed  the  plan.  It  was  prevented  from 
reaching  a  vote  by  free-silver  democrats  and  populists. 

I  still  believe  that  legislation  upon  the  line  indicated  should  be  enacted. 

But  the  wail  which  goes  up  from  the  populists  and  misguided  democrats 
upon  the  subject  of  a  contracted  currency  and  which  urges  bad  money  as  a 
remedy,  instead  of  being  one  which  would  be  beneficial  to  the  people,  would 
prove  their  greatest  injury. 


17 

There  is  a  growing  sentiment  among  the  great  nations  of  the  world  to  en- 
large the  use  of  silver.  The  course  of  the  United  States  during  the  last  two 
years  has  strengthened  this  sentiment.  The  way  for  us  to  help  those  engaged 
abroad  in  this  work  is  to  let  it  be  seen  that  we  can  command  what  gold  we 
need,  and  that  other  countries  are  as  much  interested  in  the  movement  as  we.  I 
think  legislation  immediately  retiring  all  money  below  ten  dollars  except  silver, 
which  was  partially  urged  by  Hon.  B.  H.  Hill  in  1878,  would  be  wise  and 
helpful . 

THE   EXAMPLE   OF   FRANCE. 

The  condition  of  France  is  often  referred  to.  France  has  more  money  per 
capita  than  any  other  country  in  the  world.  But  the  paper  and  silver  money 
of  France  combined  (those  being  the  moneys  which  need  the  support  of  the 
Government  to  sustain  them)  are  not  as  much  per  capita  as  the  paper  and  silver 
in  the  United  States.  Where  France  has  her  advantage  of  us  is  in  her  very  large 
per  capita  of  gold.  France  has  $21.54  per  capita  of  gold.  And  this  gold  has 
poured  into  France  since  1874,  when  she  suspended  the  unlimited  coinage  of 
silver  and  adopted  limited  bimetallism.  I  mention  this,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
urging  that  this  country  shall  not  change  from  the  present  plan  of  limited 
coinage  of  silver,  but  to  show  that  the  alleged  injury  from  the  present  plan — if 
France  is  taken  as  an  illustration — might  prove  not  an  injury  but  a  benefit. 

OPINION   OF   GREAT   BIMETALLISTS. 

The  greatest  advocates  of  bimetallism  oppose  unlimited,  independent  coin- 
age. The  fact  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  greatest  students  of  finance, 
who  advocate  a  bimetallic  currency  oppose  unlimited,  independent  coinage  at 
16  to  1.  Perhaps  the  ablest  writer  and  thinker  upon  this  subject  in  the  United 
States  is  Dr.  Andrews,  who  represented  this  country  at  the  last  international 
monetary  conference.  In  his  work,  "As  HONEST  DOLLAR,"  although  he  urges 
many  arguments  in  favor  of  a  bimetallic  currency,  he  declares  :  "Neither  the 
United  States  nor  any  other  nation  would  be  wise  in  undertaking,  alone,  to  rein- 
state silver.  The  result  of  such  an  effort,  I  think,  would  be  that  the  nation 
making  it  would  simply  bid  farewell  to  the  gold-using  section  of  mankind,  and 
go  over  to  the  users  of  silver. 

"Were  we,  in  our  present  condition,  to  institute  the  free  coinage  of  silver, 
the  first  consequence  would  be  the  hegira  of  gold,  leading  to  dreadful  strin- 
gency, and  a  much  greater  fall  in  prices  than  we  have  thus  far  seen.  This  agony 
being  over,  as  the  mints  began  to  turn  out  great  piles  of  silver  dollars,  to  circu- ' 
late  either  directly  or  by  proxy,  prices  would  slowly  rise  to  the  Mexican,  level. 
We  would  have  left  Europe  in  order  to  join  Mexico,  Central  and  South  America, 
Japan  and  China.  I  can  see  how  high  protectionists  might  earnestly  desire 
such  a  result,  for  the  wall  which  the  change  would  erect  between  Europe  and 
America  would  be  more  impassable  than  any  that  McKinley  tariffs  could  create." 

At  the  recent  German  bimetallic  conference  it  was  expressly  declared  that 
there  was  no  purpose  to  embark  Germany  in  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver 
independent  of  the  action  of  other  countries.  At  one  time  Mr.  Henry  Hucks 
Gibbs,  president  of  the  bimetallic  league  of  England,  was  understood  to  favor 
independent  action.  And  he  is  so  quoted  by  Dr.  Andrews.  But  in  a  speech 
delivered  last  year,  referring  to  the  ratio  which  must  be  fixed  for  the  coinage  of 
gold  and  silver,  he  declared  that  "  the  terms  of  the  treaty  that  shall  bring  this 


18 

about,  the  details  of  the  measure,  and  the  means  by  which  it  is  carried  out  and 
the  safeguards  which  will  have  to  be  applied  are  a  matter  of  international 
concern." 

Mr.  Balf our,  so  much  quoted .  by  the  extreme  silver  men,  in  his  celebrated 
address  delivered  two  years  ago,  expressed  himself  in  favor  of  "  a  more  effective 
international  system  under  which  every  great  commercial  community' shall  con- 
tribute its  share  to  maintain  the  stability  and  value  of  silver." 

A  recent  conference  of  bimetallists  in  France,  as  far  as  I  have  seen  by  a 
translation  of  their  proceedings,  showed  no  member  who  believed  it  possible 
for  a  single  country  to  sustain  a  bimetallic  currency  with  unlimited  independent 
coinage  at  existing  ratios.  The  extreme  silver  men  in  the  United  States  to-day 
are  not  in  touch  with  the  world's  great  advocates  of  bimetallism,  but  are  press- 
ing forward  upon  a  line  recognized  to  be  destructive  of  the  possibility  of  bi- 
metallism and  productive  only  of  silver  monometallism. 

EFFECT  OF    FEEE,    UNLIMITED   AND  INDEPENDENT    COINAGE   OF  SILVER  AT   16  TO   1. 

"What  would  be  the  effect  of  free,  unlimited,  independent  coinage  of  silver 
at  16  to  1  ?  I  have  shown  that  it  would  be  impossible  by  such  legislation  to 
substantially  change  the  value  of  silver.  I  have  shown  that,  as  a  necessary  re- 
sult, our  silver  dollar  would  drop  in  its  value  to  the  commercial  value  of  the 
bullion  put  into  it ;  that  is  to  say,  that  it  would  drop  about  one-half  in  value. 
Gold,  then,  measured  by  our  silver,  would  be  worth  two  for  one.  No  man 
would  allow  gold  to  circulate  as  money  when  he  could  buy  with  the  gold  twice 
as  many  dollars  in  silver  that  could  do  the  same  work,  perform  the  same  duty. 
No  man  would  coin  gold  into  dollars  when  he  could  exchange  the  gold  required 
for  the  coinage  of  five  dollars  for  silver  bullion  which  could  be  coined  into  ten 
dollars.  According  to  the  Gresham  law,  by  all  the  tests  of  logic,  and  all  his- 
tory, the  gold  would  at  once  go  out  of  circulation  and  the  paper  promises  of  the 
United  States  would  go  out  of  circulation  also  ;  their  holders  would  keep  them, 
waiting  until  the  time  when  wiser  legislation  would  do  away  with  the  Asiatic 
silver  standard.  Our  currency,  our  money  proper,  would  at  once  be  contracted 
one-half.  Our  currency,  before  described,  consisting  of  checks,  bills  of  ex- 
change, bills  of  credit,  making  95  per  cent,  of  our  entire  circulating  medium, 
based,  as  it  is,  upon  credit  and  confidence,  would  at  once  cease  to  be  used.  We 
had  an  illustration  of  this  during  the  summer  of  1893,  when,  with  simply  the 
threat  of  depreciated  silver,  it  was  impossible  to  do  any  business  by  modes  of 
credit,  by  checks,  or  bills  of  exchange. 

The  new  president,  if  elected  on  a  free  silver  ticket,  would  be  elected  in 
November,  and  could  not  be  inaugurated  for  six  months.  If  he  called  Congress 
together  at  once  upon  his  inauguration,  it  would  be  several  months  before  any 
legislation  could  be  passed.  In  the  mean  time,  from  the  very  hour  it  was  ap- 
parent that  legislation  would  be  passed  bringing  this  country  to  the  standard 
of  a  dollar  worth  only  half  as  much  as  the  present  dollar,  every  man  who  had  a 
debt  due  him,  unless  the  obligation  upon  its  face  was  payable  in  gold,  would 
commence  an  effort  to  collect  it.  He  would  justly  feel  that  he  had  done  work 
or  loaned  money  upon  a  standard  of  a  dollar  worth  a  hundred  cents,  a  dollar 
worth  two  Mexican  dollars,  and  that  it  would  be  foolish  to  take  in  settlement  of 
his  debts  dollars  worth  only  half  as  much  as  those  due  to  him  or  loaned  out  by 
him. 


19 

Debtors  who  owed  money  not  payable  in  gold  would  never  see  the  day  come 
when  this  new  legislation,  this  unlimited  silver  legislation,  this  depreciated 
money  legislation,  would  enable  them  to  pay  off  their  debts  at  fifty  cents  on  the 
dollar.  They  would  be  forced  to  pay  at  once,  or  else  the  sheriff  would  be  sell- 
ing their  property,  and  the  result  would  be  to  force  every  debtor  to  settle  up  or 
else  renew  in  gold.  Debtors  who  owed  obligations  payable  in  gold  would  find 
it  necessary  to  buy  gold  as  a  commodity.  Under  such  a  condition  of  excite- 
ment interest  would  rise,  and  those  who  secured  renewals  would  be  compelled 
to  do  so  at  largely  increased  rates.  Banks  would  be  raided.  The  money  in  sav- 
ings institutions  would  be  withdrawn.  Merchants  would  be  forced  to  settle  their 
debts,  and  would  therefore  collect  from  those  who  owed  them.  Business  would 
stop,  because  in  such  a  condition  of  uncertainty  no  one  would  feel  justified 
either  in  buying  or  selling.  Manufactories  would  be  closed — for  the  loss  of 
that  part  of  our  currency  which  consists  of  credit  would  prevent  them  from 
being  able  to  do  business.  Men  would  be  thrown  out  of  employment  all  over 
the  land.  The  prices  of  farm  products  would  drop,  and  misery  and  distress 
would  cover  the  land. 

/       ITS   FINAL   EFFECT. 

After  the  immediate  incidents  of  contraction  and  paralysis  of  trade  which 
wonld  be  produced  pending  the  passage  of  a  bill  for  the  unlimited,  independent 
coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1,  there  would  then  follow  a  period  of  continued  busi- 
ness prostration,  less  aggravated,  no  doubt,  than  that  of  the  first  twelve  months. 
All  business  would  gradually  seek  to  adjust  itself  to  the  new  standard.  Until 
this  process  could  be  completed  the  ultimate  effect  of  the  silver  standard  would 
not  be  reached.  Finally,  when  it  was  reached  and  business  became  completely 
adjusted  to  it,  then  what  benefits  could  be  expected  ?  I  am  able  to  see  none. 
We  would  do  business  upon  a  standard  not  recognized  by  the  great  countries 
from  which  we  chiefly  buy  and  to  which  we  chiefly  sell.  Exchanges  would  all 
be  against  us.  We,  being  in  the  minority,  so  far  as  standard  of  measurement 
was  concerned,  would  find  that  when  we  bought  we  would  have  to  pay  a  price 
based  upon  the  lowest  fluctuation  of  silver,  and  when  we  sold  we  would  receive 
a  price  based  upon  the  highest  fluctuation  of  silver.  Its  changeable  status  in 
the  market  during  the  past  two  years  would  show  how  greatly  such  a  condition 
would  burden  trade  and  hinder  commerce.  Not  only  would  this  be  its  effect 
upon  international  transactions,  but  the  uncertainty  of  the  standard  would  dis- 
courage domestic  credits,  domestic  business,  domestic  enterprise. 

EFFECT  ON  WAGE  EAJRNERS. 

After  all,  however,  the  men  who  would  suffer  most  would  be  those  who  work 
for  wages  or  salaries.  They  would  find  their  dollars,  while  the  same  in  number, 
but  half  the  value  of  those  formerly  paid  them.  What  guarantee  would  they 
have  of  an  immediate  increase  ?  Gradually,  in  the  course  of  time,  no  doubt, 
their  wages  and  salaries  would  move  up  to  double  the  number  of  dollars  now 
paid  them,  so  as  to  be  equal  in  value  to  the  sums  they  now  receive  ;  but  history 
has  shown  that  the  advance  of  pay  to  those  people  who  work  for  wages  or 
salaries  has  always  been  the.  last  to  change  incident  to  a  depreciated  currency. 
And  there  is  every  reason  to  know  that  past  experience  would  be  repeated  in 
the  future,  if  the  misfortune  should  ever  come  to  our  country  of  adopting  the 
views  of  the  extreme  silver  men. 


20 

This  is  a  just  picture  of  the  consequences  to  be  brought  upon  our  people 
by  the  success  of  those  who  advocate  the  free,  unlimited,  independent  coinage 
of  silver  at  16  to  1. 

CALAMITY    HOWLEBS. 

But  I  am  told  through  the  columns  of  one  of  the  advocates  of  this  scheme 
that  I  have  become  a  calamity  howler.  This  is  not  true.  A  calamity  howler  is 
a  man  who  complains  of  the  present,  who  complains  of  things  which  exist.  To 
show  the  evils  incident  to  the  unwise  schemes  of  the  extreme  silver  advocates, 
were  they  to  succeed,  is  to  warn  the  public  against  danger,  that  danger  may  be 
averted.  In  doing  so  it  gives  me  pleasure  to  answer  those  who  misrepresent 
the  present,  who  fill  the  columns  of  papers  with  complaints  about  our  own  state. 
To  carry  out  their  political  schemes  they  have  been  willing  to  actually  advertise 
the  state  as  being  almost  in  a  bankrupt  condition.  They  have  paraded  the 
lessened  amount  of  tax  returns.  I  deny  that  this  is  any  evidence  of  the  lessened 
amount  of  real  values  in  the  state.  It  has  been  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
grand  jury  of  Fulton  county  recommended  returns  at  less  rates  in  Fulton,  and 
a  great  many  people  of  other  counties  concluded  to  follow  their  advice.  It  is  a 
natural  condition  incident  to  the  panic  that  we  have  been  through  that  men 
should  contract  their  tax  returns  ;  but  I  have  investigated  the  actual  values  of 
property  at  various  points  in  Georgia,  I  have  inquired  for  the  price  at  which  it 
can  be  bought,  and  I  deny  that  purchases  can  be  made  in  1895  as  low  as  they 
could  have  been  made  in  1894  or  1893.  This  is  the  true  test  of  returning  pros- 
perity, and  I  repudiate  the  slander  placed  upon  this  rich  and  fertile  land  of  ours 
which  would  check  investors  and  drive  away  home-seekers. 

MY  FOKMEB  POSITION. 

But  you  have  been  told  that  in  1890  I  was  in  favor  of  the!  free  coinage  of 
silver,  and  a  letter  which  I  wrote  in  the  fall  of  that  year  to  Mr.  Peek  has  fur- 
nished printers  a  chance  for  occupation  to  a  considerable  extent  during  the  past 
few  days.  It  disturbs  the  extreme  silver  men  a  great  deal  more  than  it  does 
me.  If  you  will  read  the  letter  carefully  you  will  see  that  it  committed  nie  to 
no  proposition  contained  in  it.  But  I  would  not  be  candid  if  I  did  not  say  that 
frequently  in  1890  I  expressed  myself  in  favor  of  free  coinage  of  silver.  I  do 
not  know  that  I  ever  expressed  myself  in  favor  of  free,  unlimited,  independent 
coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1.  I  am  not  sure  that  I  had  ever  investigated  the 
meaning  of  the  term  at  that  time.  I  do  not  think  I  had.  But  when  I  used  the 
term  "free  coinage  of  silver,"!  used  it  in  its  general  sense,  which  means 
unlimited  coinage  at  the  existing  ratio  of  16  to  1.  I  simply  desire  to  say  that 
with  only  a  limited  investigation  of  the  subject,  I  entertained  the  opinion  then 
expressed.  Since  that  time  the  further  effort  to  bolster  silver  through  the  Sher- 
man act,  which  increased  enormously  our  purchases  of  silver,  failed,  and  silver 
dropped  about  thirty  per  cent,  on  the  dollar.  These  two  things  combined — the 
fall  of  silver  since  that  time  and  the  further  investigation  of  the  question — have 
satisfied  me  beyond  a  doubt  that  the  scheme  is  dangerous  and  that  its  results 
would  be  disastrous.  I  would  be  less  than  a  man  if  I  did  not  have  the  courage 
to  combat  a  threatened  evil  because  at  one  time  I  did  not  know  its  injurious 
effects. 

THE   DEMOCRATIC   PLATFORM. 

I  cannot  see  how  any  democrat  who  studies  the  platforms  of  his  party  can 
be  willing  to  support  this  policy. 


21 

A  careful  examination  shows  that  whenever  the  democratic  party,  in  national 
convention,  has  spoken  upon  the  subject  of  currency,  it  has  declared  emphati- 
cally for  sound  money.  The  platform  of  1876  uses  the  following  language  : 

"We  denoiince  the  failure,  for  all  these  eleven  years  of  peace,  to  make  good 
the  promise  of  the  legal-tender  notes,  which  are  a  changing  standard  of  value 
in  the  hands  of  the  people,  and  the  non-payment  of  which  is  a  disregard  of  the 
plighted  faith  of  the  nation. 

********** 

"We  denounce  the  financial  imbecility  and  immorality  of  that  party,  which 
during  eleven  years  of  peace  has  made  no  advance  toward  resumption,  but  in- 
stead has  obstructed  resumption  by  wasting  our  resources  and  exhausting  all 
our  surplus  income. 

********** 

"  We  demand  a  judicious  system  of  preparation  by  public  economies,  by 
official  retrenchments,  and  by  wise  finance,  which  shall  enable  the  nation  soon 
to  assure  the  whole  world  of  its  perfect  ability  and  its  perfect  readiness  to  meet 
any  of  its  promises  at  the  call  of  the  creditor  entitled  to  payment. 

********** 

"We  believe  such  a  system,  well  devised,  and,  above  all,  intrusted  to  com- 
petent hands  for  execution,  creating  at  no  time  an  artificial  scarcity  of  currency, 
and  at  no  time  alarming  the  public  mind  into  a  withdrawal  of  that  vaster 
machinery  of  credit  by  which  95  per  cent,  of  all  business  transactions  are 
performed — a  system  open,  public  and  inspiring  general  confidence,  would  from 
the  day  of  its  adoption  bring  healing  on  its  wings  to  all  our  harassed  industries, 
set  in  motion  the  wheels  of  commerce,  manufactures,  and  the  mechanical  arts, 
restore  employment  to  labor,  and  renew  in  all  its  natural  sources  the  prosperity 
of  the  people. " 

The  principles  announced  by  the  party,  above  quoted,  are  those  for  which  I 
contend  to-day.  In  no  platform  of  the  party  can  be  found  anything  which 
would  recognize  the  unlimited  coinage  of  a  metal  while  putting  into  a  dollar 
less  than  one  hundred  cents'  worth  of  the  metal. 

The  democratic  national  platform  of  1892  is  the  last  official  declaration  of  the 
party.  Upon  the  subject  under  consideration  it  reads  as  follows  : 

"  Sec.  7.  We  denounce  the  republican  legislation  known  as  the  Sherman  act  of 
1890  as  a  cowardly  makeshift,  fraught  with  possibilities  of  danger  in  the  future 
which  should  make  all  of  its  supporters,  as  well  as  its  author,  anxious  for  its 
speedy  repeal.  We  hold  to  the  use  of  both  gold  and  silver  as  the  standard  money 
of  the  country,  and  to  the  coinage  of  both  gold  and  silver  without  discrimin- 
ating against  either  metal  or  charge  for  mintage  ;  but  the  dollar  unit  of  coinage 
of  both  metals  must  be  of  equal  intrinsic  and  exchangeable  value  or  be  adjusted 
through  international  agreement  or  by  such  safeguards  of  legislation  as 
shall  insure  the  maintenance  of  the  parity  of  the  two  metals  and  the  equal 
power  of  every  dollar  at  all  times  in  the  markets  and  in  the  payment  of  debts  ; 
and  we  demand  that  all  paper  currency  shall  be  kept  at  par  with  and  redeem- 
able in  such  coin.  We  insist  upon  this  policy  as  especially  necessary  for  the 
protection  of  farmers  and  the  laboring  classes,  the  first  and  most  defenceless 
victims  of  unstable  money  and  fluctuating  currency. 

"  Sec.  8.  We  recommend  that  the  prohibitory  10  per  cent,  tax  on  state  bank 
issues  be  repealed." 

Let  us  analyze  section  7. 

First — It  demands  the  repeal  of  the  Sherman  act  of  1890. 


UCSB   LIBRARY 


Second—  It  expresses  a  desire  for  the  use  of  both  gold  and  silver  as  stand- 
ard money,  and  for  the  coinage  of  both  without  discrimination  or  charge  for 
mintage.  Unlimited  coinage  of  silver  and  gold  at  the  ratio  of  16  to  1  would  be 
a  discrimination  —  requiring  only  fifty  cents'  worth  of  silver  while  requiring  a 
hundred  cents  worth  of  gold  put  into  a  dollar. 

Third  —  It  requires  the  dollar  unit  of  coinage  of  both  metals  to  be  of  equal 
exchangeable  and  intrinsic  value.  Unlimited  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1  would 
entirely  disregard  this  provision.  It  would  make  the  dollar  unit  of  silver  intrin- 
sically worth  but  half  as  much  as  the  dollar  unit  of  gold,  and  instead  of  being 
exchangeable  it  would  take  twice  as  much  as  the  silver  bullion  put  into  a  dollar 
to  be  of  an  equal  exchangeable  value  with  the  gold  bullion  put  into  a  dollar. 

Fourth  —  The  next  clause  is,  "<or  to  be  adjusted  through  international  agree- 
ment." The  extreme  silver  people  ridicule  international  agreement. 

Fifth  —  The  next  clause  declares  for  safeguards  of  legislation  which  shall  in- 
sure the  maintenance  of  the  parity  of  the  two  metals  and  the  equal  power  of  ev- 
ery dollar  at  all  times  in  the  markets  and  in  the  payment  of  all  debts.  What  is 
the  meaning  of  this  clause  ?  It  can  convey  but  one  idea,  and  that  is,  that  while 
the  democratic  party  holds  to  the  use  of  both  gold  and  silver  and  desires  their 
coinage  without  discrimination,  yet  if  this  cannot  be  done  at  once,  advantage- 
ously, through  an  international  agreement,  or  through  a  change  of  the  ratio  by 
increasing  the  amount  of  silver  bullion  put  into  a  dollar,  then  in  the  meantime 
safeguards  of  legislation  must  keep  the  two  dollars  —  the  gold  and  the  silver  dol- 
lar —  together,  so  that  each  dollar  will  always  have  the  same  purchasing  power 
in  the  markets,  whether  it  be  gold  or  silver,  and  the  equal  power  to  pay  debts. 
Unlimited  coinage  at  16  to  1  would  separate  the  dollars  and  make  a  gold  dollar 
worth  twice  as  much  as  a  silver  dollar,  for  all  purposes.  It  would  violate  the 
very  principles  for  which  our  platform  contended.  The  next  clause  of  the  plat- 
form emphasizes  this  principle  by  insisting  that  such  a  policy  is  necessary  for 
the  protection  of  farmers  and  the  laboring  classes,  "the  first  and  most  defense- 
less victims  of  unstable  money  and  fluctuating  currency." 

It  has  been  my  effort  to  show  that  this  declaration  in  the  platform  is  true  ; 
that  the  agricultural  and  laboring  classes  would  be  more  injured  by  the  dislo- 
cation of  our  currency,  by  the  adoption  of  a  debased  silver  dollar,  than  any 
other  portion  of  the  people. 

The  platform  by  itself  is  a  repudiation  of  unlimited  silver  coinage  at  16  to  1. 
But  when  we  also  remember  that  a  delegate  from  Colorado  offered  an  amendment 
to  the  platform  by  which  he  proposed  to  insert  the  word  "free  "before  the 
word  "coinage,"  and  that  his  amendment  was  overwhelmingly  voted  down, 
the  construction  which  I  place  upon  the  platform  is  relieved  of  every  possible 
doubt.  It  is  true  that  free  coinage  literally  means,  simply  coinage  without 
cost  to  the  bullion  holder  at  the  mint  ;  but,  as  I  have  before  stated,  this  is  not 
the  commonly  accepted  meaning  of  the  word  "free"  when  applied  to  the 
coinage  of  silver.  The  term  "free  coinage  of  silver"  has  been,  for  some  years, 
synonymous  with  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1.  It  was  so  under- 
stood by  the  delegate  from  Colorado.  His  purpose  was  clear.  And  when  the 
convention  voted  down  his  amendment,  it  voted  down  what  was  understood  to 
mean  a  declaration  for  unlimited  coinage  at  16  to  1. 

Then  the  convention  proceeded  to  nominate  Mr.  Cleveland  for  president  by 
a  two-thirds  vote.  Mr.  Cleveland,  in  his  message  to  congress  in  1885,  declared 
against  piling  up  too  great  a  number  of  silver  dollars  coined  each  from  less 
than  a  hundred  cents'  worth  of  silver.  In  his  letter  of  February  10,  1891,  he 
said:  "I  have  this  afternoon  received  your  note  inviting  me  to  attend  to- 
morrow evening  the  meeting  called  for  the  purpose  of  voicing  the  opposition 
of  the  business  men  of  our  citv  to  the  free  coinage  of  silver  in  the  United 
States. 

*  ******* 

"  It  surely  cannot  be  necessary  for  me  to  make  a  formal  expression  of  my 
agreement  with  those  who  believe  that  the  greatest  peril  would  be  invited  by 
the  adoption  of  the  scheme  embraced  in  the  measure  now  pending  in  congress, 
for  the  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  at  our  mints. 

"If  we  have  developed  an  unexpected  capacity  for  the  assimilation  of  a 
largely  increased  volume  of  this  currency,  and  even  if  we  have  demonstrated 


23 


the  usefulness  of  such  an  increase,  these  conditions  fall  far  short  of  insuring  us 
against  disaster  if,  in  the  present  situation,  we  enter  upon  the  dangerous  and 
reckless  experiment  of  free,  unlimited  and  independent  silver  coinage." 

This  letter  was  clear  and  unevasive.  It  was  written  in  February,  1891,  and 
published  all  over  the  United  States.  The  extreme  silver  men  at  once  declared 
that  it  defeated  lYIr.  Cleveland  for  renomination.  The  democratic  national 
convention  at  Chicago,  in  June,  1892,  voted  down  the  motion  to  commit  the 
party  to  the  free  coinage  of  silver,  and  nominated  for  president  the  man  who 
wrote  the  letter  just  quoted.  The  only  party  with  a  platform  declaring  in 
favor  of  the  free  and  unlimited  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1  is  the  populist 
party. 

While  I  know  that  many  good  democrats  without,  I  believe,  careful  consid- 
eration, have  committed  themselves  to  this  policy,  I  cannot  but  believe  that 
with  a  thorough  investigation  the  great  majority  of  them  will  see  that  the  un- 
limited, independent  coinage  of  silver  at  16  to  1  is  fitly  associated  with  many 
of  the  other  vagaries  advocated  by  the  party  which  found  its  origin,  not  in 
Georgia,  but  in  the  far  west. 

A  careful  study  of  the  states  will  show  that  the  next  national  democratic 
convention  cannot  be  committed  to  the  unlimited,  independent  coinage  of  silver 
at  16  to  1.  It  will,  no  doubt,  favor  the  use  of  all  silver  which  can  safely  be 
maintained  as  good  as  gold  ;  it  will,  no  doubt,  oppose  the  use  of  all  silver 
which  cannot  be  kept  as  good  as  gold  ;  it  will,  no  doubt,  favor  such  international 
negotiations  as  may  accomplish  the  largest  recognition  of  silver,  the  greatest 
possible  aid  from  other  countries  to  increase  a  demand  for  silver  and  its  use  as 
money.  But  upon  one  subject  I  am  sure  it  will  be  clear  and  explicit,  and 
that  will  be  against  the  free,  unlimited  and  independent  coinage  of  ilver  at 
the  ratio  of  16  to  1. 

It  is  important  for  democrats  to  study  this  question  ;  to  understand  it,  that 
they  may  be  ready  to  fall  into  line  with  their  party  in  1896  and  to  sustain  its 
platform. 

The  eyes  of  the  world  are  on  the  south,  and  especially  upon  our  own  state. 

As  never  before  we  can  expecf;  thejjgrowth  which  will  come  from  a  tide  of 
home-seekers  and  investors. 

In  behalf  of  sound  business  principles,  in  the  name  of  the  democratic  party, 
for  the  future  of  the  state  and  your  own  interests,  I  appeal  to  you  to  oppose  a 
plan  of  legislation  containing  no  good  for  you  and  full  of  incalculable  injury. 

APPENDIX — CIRCULATION  PER  CAPITA  AND  AVERAGE  N.  Y.  PRICE  OP  COTTON. 


Year. 

Circula- 
tion in 
U.S. 

Average 
N.  Y.  price 
Cotton 

Year. 

Circula- 
tion in 
U.S. 

Average 
N.  Y.  price 
Cotton 

Year. 

Circula- 
tion in 
U.S. 

Average 

N.  Y. 
Price 

per  capita. 

per  Ib. 

per  capita. 

per  Ib. 

per  capita. 

Cotton 
per  Ib. 

1800. 

$4.99 

28.00  cts. 

1850. 

$12.02 

12.  34  cts. 

1P73. 

.     $18.04 

18.  15  cts. 

1810. 

7.60 

16.00 

1851. 

13.76 

12.14 

1874. 

.       18.13 

17.00 

1820. 

6.96 

17.00 

1853. 

14.63 

9.50 

1875. 

17.16 

15.00 

1830. 

6.69 

10.04 

1853 

15.80 

11.02 

1876. 

16.12 

13.00 

1831. 

1        7.04 

9.71 

1854. 

16.10 

10.97 

1877. 

15.58 

11.73 

1832. 

8.64 

9.38 

1855. 

15.34 

10.39 

1878. 

15.32 

11.28 

1833. 

8.60 

12.32 

1«56. 

15.16 

10.30 

1379. 

16.75 

10.83 

1831. 

8.64 

12.90 

1857 

15.81 

13.51 

1880. 

19.41 

12.0-2 

1835 

9  86 

17  45 

1858 

13.78 

12.23 

1881. 

.        21.71 

11.34 

1836. 

13.17 

16.50 

1859. 

14.35 

12.08 

1882. 

22.37 

12.16 

1837. 

13.87 

13.25 

1860. 

13.85 

11.00 

1883. 

.        22.91 

10.63 

1838 

12.33 

10.14 

1861. 

13.98 

13  01 

1884. 

22.65 

10.64 

1839. 

13.26 

13.86 

1862. 

10  23 

31.29 

1885. 

23.02 

10.54 

1840. 

10.91 

8.92 

1863. 

17.84 

67.21 

1  86. 

21  .82 

9.44 

1841. 

10.59 

9.50 

1864. 

19.67 

101.50 

1887. 

22.45 

10.25 

1812. 

9.02 

7.85 

1865. 

20.57 

83.38 

1888. 

.        22.88 

10.27 

-*43. 

7.87 

7.25 

1S66. 

18.99 

43.20 

1889. 

22.52 

10.71 

*. 

8.68 

7.73 

1867. 

18  28 

31.59 

1890. 

.        22.82 

11.53 

X 

8.95 

5.63 

1368. 

18.39 

24.85 

1891. 

23.41 

9.03 

X        9.43 

7.87 

1869. 

17.  6C 

29.01 

1892. 

24.44 

7.64 

X.    10.59 

11.21 

1870. 

17.50 

23.98 

1893. 

23.85 

8.24 

X0.66 

8.03 

1871. 

18.10 

16  95 

1&94. 

24.30 

7.67 

X 

7.55 

1872. 

18.19 

20.48 

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